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Discretionary Life Sentences for
Juveniles: Resolving the Split Between
the Virginia Supreme Court and the
Fourth Circuit
Daniel M. Coble
“We make this ruling not with any satisfaction but to sustain
the law. As for Malvo, who knows but God how he will bear the
future.”
—Judge Niemeyer, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit
Abstract
At the age of 17, Donte Lamar Jones shot and killed a store
clerk as she laid down on the floor during a robbery. He was spared
the death penalty by agreeing instead to die in prison at the end of
his life. Two years later in Virginia, 12 individuals were murdered
for doing nothing more than being in the wrong place at the wrong
time. Those individuals were killed by Lee Malvo and John
Muhammad, better known as the “D.C. Snipers.” While John
Muhammad was given the death penalty for his heinous crimes, Lee
Malvo, who was 17 during the murder spree, was given a life
sentence. What these two cases have in common is one issue: as
juveniles they were both condemned to die in prison. What separates
their cases is their legal challenges and how two different courts
have ruled—one federal, one state. While the facts of their cases
might be different, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of cases
across the United States that reflect similar legal proceedings, and
until the Supreme Court clarifies its position, more state and
federal courts will reach different conclusions.
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I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, Supreme Court jurisprudence has
shifted markedly in how the courts treat juvenile offenders. From
eliminating the death penalty for juveniles to overturning state
courts on how they treat sentencing of those underage, the Court
has moved quickly on the scope of the Eighth Amendment. 1 It is
1. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016), as revised (Jan.
25, 2016) (“This is another case in a series of decisions involving the sentencing
of offenders who were juveniles when their crimes were committed.”); see also
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005).
This case requires us to address, for the second time in a decade and a
half, whether it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States to execute a
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evident that the next issue the Court will likely take up is whether
a juvenile may ever be sentenced to life in prison. While this Article
does not take a position on how the court should decide on that
situation, this Article contends that the court has two issues that
it must deal with before fully grappling with a new Eighth
Amendment change.
First, the Court must clarify the distinction, if any, between
Miller 2 and Montgomery, both substantively and procedurally. The
Court ruled in Miller “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility
of parole for juvenile offenders.” 3 Several years later, the Court in
Montgomery held that the holding in Miller applied retroactively
to all of the states. This has caused a split between the Virginia
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit. The Virginia Supreme
Court has interpreted Miller as applying strictly to the sentencing
statute in question (i.e., does the statute give the judge any
discretion to amend the life sentence). The Fourth Circuit has
taken a more expansive view of Miller and held that even if the
sentencing scheme is not mandatory, the sentencing judge must
have conducted a hearing before sentencing to determine if the
juvenile deserved life based on his youth.
The second issue that the Court needs to clarify is whether
plea waivers by juveniles bar the juvenile from having his case
reheard under the new framework. Some courts believe that a
defendant may waive his constitutional rights, and thus, be
precluded from appealing his sentencing. While other courts
believe that the new holding in Montgomery and Miller have
overridden any plea waivers and do not bar an appeal, whether
directly or collaterally. These two issues should be clarified by the
Supreme Court.
II. Juvenile Punishment in the 21st Century
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has
dramatically changed not only how the federal government views
juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he
committed a capital crime.
2. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
3. Id. at 479.
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punishment of juveniles, but how states are allowed to carry out
punishments. These developments have forced some state courts
to rehear old cases and allow the defendant to present mitigating
evidence as to why he or she should not die in prison. 4 These cases
paint a clear portrait of a trajectory: will the Supreme Court
ultimately rule that life without parole for juveniles is
unconstitutional?
A. Executions of Defendants with Intellectual Disability
In 2002, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia held that it would be
a violation of the Eighth Amendment to execute a defendant who
had an intellectual disability. 5 The Court looked to two issues in
holding that the execution of these defendants was
unconstitutional. First, the Court found that the practice was not
common among the states, and secondly, the deterrent factor was
not being furthered by these executions. 6
B. Executions of Juvenile Defendants
Shortly after rendering its decision in Atkins, the Supreme
Court continued their development of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in Roper v. Simmons. 7 The Court followed the same
framework of Atkins and held that the execution of a defendant
who was 18 or younger at the time of their crime would be
considered cruel and unusual punishment. 8 The Court held that

4.
5.

See Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 577–78 (S.C. 2014).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (citation omitted) (“[W]e
therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution
‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally
retarded offender.”); see also Emily Powell, Underdeveloped and Over-

Sentenced: Why Eighteen-to-Twenty-Year-Olds Should Be Exempt from
Life Without Parole, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. ONLINE 83 (2018).
6.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317–21; Powell, supra note 5, at 86.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
Id. at 563 (“Three Terms ago the subject was reconsidered in Atkins. We
held that standards of decency have evolved since Penry and now demonstrate
that the execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment.”).

7.
8.
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these types of punishments were a violation of both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 9
C. Life Without Parole for Non-Homicide Juveniles
In 2010, the Supreme Court held that it violated the
constitution to sentence juvenile offenders to life without parole for
a conviction of a non-homicide offense. The court followed its
two-prong approach to these cases and found that even though
many states had these penal laws on the books, they were rarely
used. They also found that because of juveniles’ youth and
culpability level, the punishment was not proportional.10
D. Mandatory Life Without Parole for Juveniles
The Court continued to grow its jurisprudence in this arena
with its decision in Miller v. Alabama. 11 Justice Kagan, writing for
the majority, first explains the precedent that children are
uniquely different than adults, and should thus be treated
differently in the criminal justice system. 12 Kagan’s extensive
analysis of how juveniles are so unique and different from adults,
lays the groundwork for her next conclusion. Because life without
9. Id. at 578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition
of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes
were committed.”).
10. Graham v. Fla., 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010), as modified (July 6, 2010)
(citations omitted) (“In the cases adopting categorical rules the Court has taken
the following approach. The Court first considers ‘objective indicia of society’s
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice,’ to
determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice
at issue. Next, guided by ‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and
by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s
text, history, meaning, and purpose,’ the Court must determine in the exercise of
its own independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates the
Constitution.”); see also Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All:
Graham v. Florida and the Court's "Kids Are Different" Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 36 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (2011).
11. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
12. Id.
at
471
(“To
start
with
the
first
set
of
cases: Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing.”).
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parole is essentially equivalent, or at least close to, the death
penalty in its harshness, a judge or jury must consider the unique
characteristics of a juvenile before sentencing them to the ultimate
punishment. 13
After this ruling, courts across the nation had to grapple with
its effects. First, did this case apply retroactively to the states? And
second, how does a court determine if a court had considered the
defendant’s youth at the time of sentencing?
The Court took up these issues in Montgomery v. Louisiana. 14
The Court held that Miller created a substantive new
constitutional rule and because of that, the rule applied
retroactively to the states. Justice Kennedy first had to address
how retroactive application works, and if it would work in this
situation. In Teague v. Lane, 15 the Court created a framework for
determining when new Supreme Court precedent would apply
retroactively to cases already decided. This framework held that
ordinarily new constitutional rules of criminal procedure do not
apply to cases that have been adjudicated. However, there are two
exceptions. First, new substantive rules. The Court held that
“[s]ubstantive rules include ‘rules forbidding criminal punishment
of certain primary conduct,’ as well as ‘rules prohibiting a certain
category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense.’” 16 The second exception are “watershed rules of
criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” 17 The Court then created a
new rule in its application of retroactivity: “The Court now holds
that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the
outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review
courts to give retroactive effect to that rule. Teague’s conclusion
establishing the retroactivity of new substantive rules is best
understood as resting upon constitutional premises. That
13. Id. at 475 (citation omitted) (“That correspondence—Graham’s
‘[t]reat[ment] [of] juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital punishment,’—
makes relevant here a second line of our precedents, demanding individualized
sentencing when imposing the death penalty.”).
14. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), as revised (Jan. 27,
2016).
15. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
16. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728.
17. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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constitutional command is, like all federal law, binding on state
courts.” 18
Justice Kennedy then had to decide if Miller did in fact create
a new substantive rule. Following the same logic and analysis as
Justice Kagan in Miller, Kennedy held that Miller indeed did
create a new substantive rule that the states must apply
retroactively. 19
III. Malvo v. Mathena
The D.C. sniper case was one of the most horrific and
disturbing cases witnessed in our nation. For almost two months,
Lee Malvo and John Muhammad, terrorized the Washington, D.C.
area and killed 12 individuals. 20 Malvo was 17 years old at the time
of the killing. Of the dozen murders, Malvo admitted to committing
two of them. Malvo was first tried in Fairfax County, Virginia as
an adult for capital murder. He was found guilty of the crime and
a jury, at the sentencing phase of the trial, decided to send Malvo
to prison for the rest of his life. After this conviction, Malvo entered
into an Alford plea for another capital charge in Chesapeake City
Circuit Court. As part of his plea deal, the prosecution dropped
several charges and agreed that Malvo would avoid the death
penalty and instead receive two terms of life imprisonment. Under
this plea deal, Malvo waived his right to appeal.
After the conclusion of these cases, the Supreme Court came
out with its decision in Miller, holding that mandatory life
imprisonment for juveniles was unconstitutional. Malvo attempted
to have his cases reheard under this framework, but the district
court denied his request concluding that the Miller case was not
retroactive. 21 However, several years later, the Court handed down
its opinion in Montgomery clarifying that Miller was in fact
retroactive. Malvo again appealed his sentencing, and this time
was successful. The district court granted Malvo’s habeas petitions
and vacated his life imprisonment sentences.
18.

Id. at 729.

19. Id. at 736 (“The Court now holds that Miller announced a substantive

rule of constitutional law.”).
20. Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 267 (4th Cir. 2018).
21. Id. at 270.
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The Fourth Circuit accepted this appeal on behalf of the
warden of the detention facility and upheld the lower court. The
court analyzed and addressed the warden’s three arguments as to
why Malvo should not be granted a rehearing as to sentencing.
A. Mandatory vs. Discretionary
The warden argues that Miller does not apply in this situation
because the defendant was not given a mandatory life
imprisonment sentence. Rather, the judge had the discretion to
suspend parts of the sentence. Under Virginia law, a judge has the
discretion to suspend, in whole or part, life sentences following a
conviction of a capital offense. 22 Because the judge has this
discretion, then Malvo was not automatically sentenced to life
imprisonment. The warden contends that because there was a
sentencing phase, where the defense argued against the death
penalty, the judge could have suspended part of his sentence.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with this assertion. The court
held that Montgomery not only applied Miller retroactively, but it
also expanded Miller’s holding:
To be sure, all the penalty schemes before the Supreme Court
in
both Miller and Montgomery were
mandatory.
Yet
the Montgomery Court confirmed that, even though imposing a
life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender
pursuant to a mandatory penalty scheme necessarily violates
the Eighth Amendment as construed in Miller, a sentencing
judge also violates Miller’s rule any time it imposes a
discretionary life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile
homicide offender without first concluding that the offender’s
“crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility,” as distinct from “the
transient immaturity of youth.” 23

While the court denied that it was expanding Montgomery, it
appears based on their reasoning that whether or not they were
doing the expanding, the second Supreme Court case at the very
least broadly interpreted Miller. The warden claimed that this
22. Id. at 273 (“As the Warden asserts, the Virginia Supreme Court has now
twice recognized that Virginia trial courts have long had the authority to suspend
life sentences in whole or in part even following a capital murder conviction—an
interpretation of Virginia law that is, of course, binding here.”).
23. Id. at 274.
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broadening of the rule was not simply enforcing substantive law
retroactively, but rather they were “rewriting it.” 24
B. Miller Was Complied With
The warden then argues that even if the Supreme Court
intended for Miller to apply to all mandatory and discretionary life
sentences, the trial court complied with the rule. Miller did not
forbid courts from sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment for
homicide cases. But rather, the court required the judge or jury to
make a finding, based on culpability and youth, as to whether that
punishment fit the crime.
In Malvo’s case, the court held a post-verdict sentencing phase
to determine whether or not the defendant should receive the
death penalty of life in prison. The court was not persuaded by this
argument because in its application the jury never actually had the
chance to reduce the sentence. The choice for the jury, even after
hearing mitigating evidence, was either life or death. The court
held that this did not comply with Miller’s holding. The court also
found that the trial judge and jury were not presented with the
specific mitigating factors relating to youth and culpability as
required by Montgomery. 25
C. Plea Waiver
The warden’s final argument is that the defendant waived any
claim he would have under Miller because of the substantial
benefit he received from his plea deal. 26 He cited to two Supreme
Court cases to “argue that both the ‘Supreme Court and this Court
24.

Id.

25. Id. at 275

Moreover, the Chesapeake City jury was never charged with finding
whether Malvo’s crimes reflected irreparable corruption or permanent
incorrigibility, a determination that is now a prerequisite to imposing
a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. Nor
were Malvo’s ‘youth and attendant circumstances’ considered by either
the jury or the judge to determine whether to sentence him to life
without parole or some lesser sentence.
26. Id.
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have made clear that guilty pleas are not open to revision when
future changes in the law alter the calculus that caused the
defendant to enter his plea.’” 27
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the interpretations and
applications of both Brady 28 and Dingle 29 in this case. The court
differentiated the facts and circumstances in those two previous
cases because the defendants in those cases were attacking their
actual convictions based on new constitutional law, whereas here,
Malvo is attacking his sentence.
After finding that the defendant in this situation is not barred
from appealing because of his plea waiver, the court then looks to
the specific waiver to determine if he did indeed waive his right to
appeal. The court found that there was nothing specific in the plea
agreement that waived his right “to challenge the constitutionality
of his sentence in a collateral proceeding in light of future Supreme
Court holdings[.]” 30
What is more interesting about this argument though, is not
the finding that the specific plea waiver did not expressly preclude
the defendant from appealing, but that the court held that the
state could likely not even enforce a broad waiver of a substantive
constitutional right. 31 The decision to affirm the lower court was
not one made lightly. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the
defendant had certain constitutional rights, and those rights
needed to be applied retroactively. 32
27. Id.
28. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
29. Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2016).
30. Malvo, 893 F.3d at 277.
31. Id.; see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725 (“Miller therefore announced
a substantive rule of constitutional law, which, like other substantive rules, is
retroactive because it ‘necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant’—
here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—‘faces a punishment that the law
cannot impose upon him.’”); see also United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 220
(4th Cir. 2005) (“Lemaster does not argue that his allegations fall within the
narrow class of claims that we have allowed a defendant to raise on direct appeal
despite a general waiver of appellate rights.); see United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d
493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant could not be said to have waived his right
to appellate review of a sentence imposed in excess of the maximum penalty
provided by statute or based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as
race.”).
32. Malvo, 893 F.3d at 277 (“Because we are bound to apply those
constitutional rules, we affirm the district court’s grant of habeas relief awarding
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IV. Jones v. Commonwealth
In 2000, the defendant Jones shot and killed a store clerk at
the age of 17. He subsequently pled guilty under Alford to capital
murder. The “court held a sentencing hearing and received a
presentence report from a probation officer. The court imposed the
life sentence pursuant to the plea agreement, as well as a 68-year
term of incarceration on the remaining 10 felony charges.” 33 After
the decision in Miller, Jones filed a motion for resentencing
pursuant to that holding. He sought to have a judge reconsider his
life sentence in light of his youth and culpability at the time of the
incident. After the trial court denied his motion, the Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. 34 They held that Jones did
not actually receive a mandatory life sentence as required for
Miller to apply. Rather, under Virginia law, the trial judge had the
opportunity to suspend any portion of his life sentence but chose
not to. Jones filed a petition of certiorari with the Supreme Court,
but shortly after that, the Court decided Montgomery. 35 The
Supreme Court vacated and remanded Jones’ case for Virginia to
rehear in light of Montgomery. In Jones II, the Virginia Supreme
Court again held that Jones’ sentencing was not unconstitutional
because the trial judge gave a discretionary life sentence and not a
mandatory one. 36
The Virginia Supreme Court addresses the three arguments
that Jones makes in regards to his life sentence. He first argues
that his life sentence was mandatory in violation of Miller. 37 He
next argues that Miller requires a presentencing hearing to
consider youth and culpability and that Virginia did not hold such
a hearing. 38 His final argument is that his plea waiver agreement
should not be held against him. 39
Malvo new sentencings. We make this ruling not with any satisfaction but to
sustain the law. As for Malvo, who knows but God how he will bear the future.”).
33. Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 81
(2017).
34. Id. at 723.
35. Id. at 707–10.
36. Id.
37. Jones , 293 Va. at 39.
38. Id. at 42.
39. Id. at 46.
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A. Mandatory vs. Discretionary

The Virginia Supreme Court held that their state law in this
case does not require a mandatory life sentence. Their law allows
for judges to suspend sentences and thus gives a juvenile an
opportunity to avoid receiving the full term. In a rather lengthy
footnote, the court lays out multiple examples of criminal statutes
with some requiring mandatory life sentences and others that are
suspendable. 40 The court then concludes that whether or not a
statute allows or disallows judicial discretion is completely
governed by state law. 41 And because the Virginia Supreme Court
has concluded that the Virginia statute allows judicial discretion,
then that is the case. 42
B. Presentencing Hearing
Jones next argues that Miller requires a hearing for a judge to
consider youth and culpability when sentencing and that Virginia
does not have that type of hearing. 43 In other words, even if
Virginia does have a discretionary sentencing scheme, the judge
did not actually utilize his discretion properly. The Virginia
Supreme Court disagreed with this assertion on a factual level.
First, the court pointed out that both Montgomery and Miller were
dealing with mandatory schemes from a state. 44 Second, the court
explains that a defendant does indeed have an “opportunity” to
present mitigating evidence for sentencing. 45 And in this case,
40. Id., at 41 n.6 (“See Code § 18.2–61(B)(2) (rape by adult offender) for an
example of a life sentence that cannot be suspended. For non-life sentences—of
varying severity—that cannot be suspended see, for example, Code §§ 3.2–
4212(D) . . . .”).
41. See id. (“Whether a state sentencing statute authorizes or precludes
judicial discretion is a matter solely governed by state law.”).
42. Id.; See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1886,
44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975) (citations omitted) (“This Court, however, repeatedly has
held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law; and that we are
bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances not present here.”).
43. Jones, 293 Va. at 42.
44. Id. (“Like the sentencing statutes in Miller, the Louisiana statute
imposing a sentence of life imprisonment on Montgomery was not subject to
suspension in whole or in part by the sentencing court.”).
45. Id. at 43 (“In Virginia, however, a criminal defendant has a statutorily
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Jones expressly waived this opportunity and stipulated to a life
sentence. 46 The court also disagrees with the contention that a
Miller-Montgomery claim cannot be waived. The court sites several
of their opinions holding that a defendant may waive many of his
constitutional rights. 47
C. Plea Waiver
The last argument Jones makes is that his sentence and plea
waiver were void ab initio (void from the start). However, the court,
in a long and painstakingly in depth analysis of procedural law,
held that Miller did not render previous life sentences as void but
rather voidable. If the sentence was void from the start, then the
proposed solution in Montgomery (i.e., new hearings for
resentencing) would not be allowed. 48 How could a court address a
sentence when that sentence would not even exist at law anymore?
V. Petition for Certiorari
On March 18, 2019, the Supreme Court granted the petition
for certiorari to hear the Malvo case. I believe that the Court needs
to address two issues. First, the Court needs to clarify its holding
in Montgomery and what it means by “an opportunity to be heard.”
Second, because this new substantive right is retroactive, state
courts across the country are going to have to decide which
defendants are entitled to a new sentencing hearing and this will
surely involve plea agreements with waivers. 49
provided opportunity to present mitigation evidence at his sentencing hearing.”).
46. Id. at 45 (“He affirmatively waived that right as part of a negotiated plea
agreement.”).
47. Id.
48. Id., at 55 (“A nonexistent nullity cannot be resurrected by some future,
uncertain event. In this respect, the Montgomery remedy is irreconcilable with
the dissent’s claim that a violation of Miller ipso facto renders the sentence void
ab initio.”).
49. Stephen K. Harper, Resentencing Juveniles Convicted of Homicide PostMiller, THE CHAMPION MAG., https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=32657
(last updated Mar. 2014) (last visited Apr. 15, 2019) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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A. An Opportunity to Be Heard

The Supreme Court should clarify two issues that have arisen
with Montgomery. First, did Montgomery create a new substantive
aspect of the Eighth Amendment when applied to discretionary life
sentences for juveniles. And second, if Montgomery has created (or
clarified) that the Eighth Amendment applies to discretionary life
sentences, then does this rule also apply retroactively. If the Court
did create new substantive law in Montgomery, then I believe they
would have to rule again and make Montgomery retroactive.
Because cert was granted for Montgomery to decide a
procedural/retroactive issue, then it would have been improper to
simply go ahead and create new substantive law. 50 However, by
taking cert on Malvo, the Court could reaffirm or deny that
Montgomery expanded the law and then have the option to
retroactively apply it (and not add any new or additional
substantive law).
1. Substantive
In Malvo, the Fourth Circuit essentially held that two things
can be unconstitutional at once. If a state has a statutory or judicial
scheme that enforces mandatory life sentences for juveniles, then
that scheme is unconstitutional. However, even if a state does not
have a mandatory life imprisonment scheme, the sentence can still
be unconstitutional if the judge does not take into consideration
the age, youth, culpability, etc. of the defendant when determining
the life sentence. The Virginia Supreme court disagreed in this
analysis and held that if the state statute for life imprisonment
gives the judge discretion and the ability to suspend part of the
sentence, then it is not mandatory and thus neither Miller nor
Montgomery apply.
Why have these two courts reached such opposite conclusions?
It is possible that as a state court Virginia feels it is necessary to
“protect its turf” when it comes to interpreting state statutes. If the
Virginia courts defer to the federal courts in this regard, then they
are likely to open a can of worms that will surely spread to other
50. Reply Brief of Petitioner Randall Mathena, Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d
265, 267 (4th Cir. 2018).
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areas of the law. Also, the Virginia courts most likely believe that
they are better at deciding what their statutes mean and how to
apply them.
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit makes a clear and direct
argument based on reality and not technicality. Merely because
the judge had the opportunity to consider youth and culpability
(and apparently, it isn’t clear that all judges even knew they had
this authority 51) does not mean that the defendant was actually
afforded the opportunity to present his mitigating evidence. The
court even agrees with the Virginia Supreme Court that their
interpretation of the statute is correct and binding: the trial judge
has the discretion to suspend life sentences. 52 However, this is of
no importance to them “because Montgomery has now made clear
that Miller’s rule has applicability beyond those situations in
which
a
juvenile
homicide
offender
received
a mandatory life-without-parole sentence.” It is not just the
mandatory scheme that violates the Eighth Amendment, “a
sentencing judge also violates Miller’s rule any time it imposes a
discretionary life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide
offender without first concluding that the offender’s ‘crimes reflect
permanent incorrigibility,’ as distinct from ‘the transient
immaturity of youth.’” 53
So how can the Supreme Court resolve this split? It is actually
quite simple. The Court needs to decide if Miller is a two-part or
one-part test. The one-part test is whether the state has a
mandatory life sentencing scheme for juveniles. The Court would
need to look at the actual penal statute as well as how the state
court has interpreted that statute. If the Court determines that the
state’s statute is mandatory, then it would violate the Eighth
Amendment, and thus, must be overturned.

51. See Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 274 (4th Cir. 2018) (“But also, as
Malvo asserts, it is far from clear that anyone involved in Malvo’s prosecutions
actually understood at the time that Virginia trial courts retained their ordinary
suspension authority following a conviction for capital murder.”).
52. See id. (“As the Warden asserts, the Virginia Supreme Court has now
twice recognized that Virginia trial courts have long had the authority to suspend
life sentences in whole or in part even following a capital murder conviction—an
interpretation of Virginia law that is, of course, binding here.”).
53. Id.
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The two-part part test would follow the ruling in Malvo. First,
is the state’s life sentencing scheme mandatory? If it is, then go no
further. The statute and sentencing are unconstitutional and must
be corrected. If the statute is not mandatory, but rather gives the
trial judge discretion in sentencing, then the next question is
whether the judge used his discretion in sentencing the juvenile to
life in prison. The trial judge would have to consider whether the
acts of the juvenile “reflected irreparable corruption or permanent
incorrigibility.” 54
The Virginia Supreme Court was forthright and intuitive
when they proclaimed that the decision on Montgomery and Miller
would have to come from a higher authority:
We acknowledge that, perhaps, some post-Montgomery opinion
from the United States Supreme Court might expand the
Eighth Amendment to “mandatory or discretionary” juvenile
life sentences generally, as the dissent proposes, with the
evident purpose of moving the bar so high that all life sentences
for convicted juvenile murderers and rapists, or juveniles
convicted of other similarly serious crimes, eventually will be
judicially deemed cruel and unusual punishment as a matter of
law. The question before us, however, “is what the law is now,
not what it may be in the future. We are not in the speculative
business of plotting the future course of federal precedents.” 55

Both the Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit make
compelling arguments as to both interpretations of Miller.
However, only the Supreme Court can make a final decision to
clear up this split in authority.
2. Procedural
While I can see how the Fourth Circuit drew the conclusion
that both mandatory and discretionary life sentences should be
treated the same under the Eighth Amendment, it is how they
came to that conclusion that I believe is troublesome. The court
held that the “distinction without a difference” in regard to
mandatory versus discretionary rule came from Montgomery:

54.
55.

Id. at 275.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29, 57 (2017).
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To be sure, all the penalty schemes before the Supreme Court
in
both Miller and Montgomery were
mandatory.
Yet
the Montgomery Court confirmed that, even though
imposing a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide
offender
pursuant
to
a
mandatory
penalty
scheme necessarily violates the Eighth Amendment as
construed in Miller, a sentencing judge also violates Miller ’s
rule any time it imposes a discretionary life-without-parole
sentence on a juvenile homicide offender without first
concluding that the offender’s “crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility,” as distinct from “the transient immaturity of
youth.” 56

However, we must look at the facts and purpose of Montgomery.
Why can’t a court simply say: “The Supreme Court, in Montgomery,
expanded and clarified the rule in Miller.”? Even though most
attorneys would say the Supreme Court can rule how it sees fit, in
actuality, the Court must stick to the facts and issues that are
before it for that specific case. In Armour & Co. v. Wantock, the
Court emphasized that the
words of our opinions are to be read in the light of the facts of
the case under discussion. To keep opinions within reasonable
bounds precludes writing into them every limitation or
variation which might be suggested by the circumstances of
cases not before the Court. General expressions transposed to
other facts are often misleading. 57

56.

Id. (emphasis added).

57. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944); See also Ameur v.

Gates, 759 F.3d 317, 324 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Ameur's broadest-possible-reading
approach is inconsistent with the analysis that we undertake in applying
Supreme Court opinions. ‘[G]eneral expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken
in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.’”); see also
Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 242 (2016) (citation omitted). But the
duty to follow binding precedent is fixed upon case-specific holdings, not general
expressions in an opinion that exceed the scope of a specific holding. Though
perhaps a subtle distinction, Chief Justice John Marshall emphasized its
importance to the judicial process: It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that
general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case
in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very
point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question
actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full
extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in their
relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom
completely investigated.
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Our judicial system is based in part on predictability. Appellate
courts are even stricter in enforcing this type of predictability and
accountability because they only prepare for what they are told the
issues will be (of course no appellate attorney would say that to a
judge during oral arguments).
So, then we must ask, what was the issue and what were the
facts before the Court in Montgomery? The issue appears to be
straightforward:
Montgomery sought state collateral relief, arguing
that Miller rendered
his
mandatory
life-without-parole
sentence illegal. The trial court denied his motion, and his
application for a supervisory writ was denied by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which had previously held that Miller does not
have retroactive effect in cases on state collateral review.
Held: This Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the
Louisiana Supreme Court correctly refused to give retroactive
effect to Miller. 58

Justice Kennedy states in the third sentence of the opinion
that “the question has arisen whether its holding is retroactive to
juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final
when Miller was decided.” 59 And because different courts had
reached different conclusions to that question, “[c]ertiorari was
granted in this case to resolve the question.” 60 From the beginning
of the opinion, it is apparent that the issue being addressed in
Montgomery is retroactivity.
What about the facts? In both Miller and Montgomery, the
state sentencing schemes required mandatory life sentences for
the juvenile defendants. 61 The Virginia Supreme Court has clearly
pointed out, and the Fourth Circuit agreed, that the Virginia
statute was not mandatory, but allowed judicial discretion. 62
Based on Justice Kennedy’s opinion, as well as an agreement
between Jones and Malvo, Montgomery was addressing a very
58. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2016).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Jones, 293 Va. at 56–57 (“Both cases addressed mandatory life
sentences *without possibility of parole.”); Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 274
(4th Cir. 2018) (“To be sure, all the penalty schemes before the Supreme Court in
both Miller and Montgomery were mandatory.”).
62. Malvo, 893 F.3d at 274.
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specific issue. Therefore, the potential “clarification” or “addition”
to Miller should be considered dicta because it would not have been
procedurally proper for the Court to address legal areas outside of
the specific issues before it. The reasoning in Malvo is that the
Court in Miller created a rule, then Montgomery clarified that rule,
because of that clarification, the new rule in Miller applies. This
appears to be circular reasoning to reach the correct conclusion,
but a conclusion that only the Supreme Court may reach.
B. Plea Waiver
Even if a defendant is found to have had his Eighth
Amendment rights violated because of a mandatory sentencing
scheme, what happens if the juvenile defendant waived his right
to appeal any constitutional issues that may arise? This is
addressed in both Malvo and Jones, and not surprisingly, each
court reaches a different conclusion.
The Virginia Supreme Court questions how a defendant can
now raise an issue on appeal, when he voluntarily waived his right
to that very appeal. 63 And in practicality, it would be impossible
for a court to hold a presentencing hearing if a defendant waived
his right to such a hearing. It would also violate the plea agreement
and negatively affect the juvenile defendant if the court rejected
the plea offer and insisted on having a presentencing hearing. The
court did not distinguish between waiving a constitutional right
under the Eighth Amendment from any other constitutional right
a defendant may waive. 64
63. Jones, 293 Va. at 45 (“We are thus free to employ traditional waiver
principles applicable to plea agreements. Those principles, in our opinion, are
dispositive in this case.”).
64. Id. (“[W]e fail to see how his Miller-Montgomery claim can be immunized
from waiver principles that govern all other constitutional challenges.”); see also
Brown v. Epps, 91 Va. 726, 21 S.E. 119, 122 (1895) (“That a prisoner may waive
many of his constitutional rights is beyond a doubt.”); But see Rawls v.
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213, 221, 683 S.E.2d 544, 549 (2009) (citation omitted)
Today we adopt the following rule that is designed to ensure that all
criminal defendants whose punishments have been fixed in violation
of the statutorily prescribed ranges are treated uniformly without any
speculation. We hold that a sentence imposed in violation of a
prescribed statutory range of punishment is void ab initio because ‘the
character of the judgment was not such as the [C]ourt had the power
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In Malvo, the court first seeks to clarify what the defendant is
seeking to overturn. It is the actual sentence he received as a
juvenile that was unconstitutional, not the underlying
conviction. 65 This distinction is important because the Supreme
Court has previously held “that guilty pleas are not open to
revision when future changes in the law alter the calculus that
caused the defendant to enter his plea.” 66 The actual sentence
Malvo received was an illegal sentence and therefore it does not
fall under the “but for” type of analysis. The next issue the court
addresses is whether a defendant can waive this type of
constitutional right. They speculate that “it is far from clear that a
broad waiver of a substantive constitutional right, as the Warden
maintains happened here, would even be enforceable.” 67
The distinction between these two courts, when it applies to
plea waivers, appears to fall on the question of whether the
sentence was unlawful or not. The Virginia Supreme Court does
not believe that the sentence Jones received was unlawful because
a judge did not go outside of the statutorily proscribed term.
Because the judge did not violate the sentencing statute, then he
did not go outside of his jurisdiction, and thus the sentence in itself
was not void ab initio. 68 The Fourth Circuit took the view that that
Malvo’s sentence was actually unlawful based on the new
substantive rule by the Supreme Court and that procedurally there
was not an issue in how the defendant appealed. 69 Because of these
to render.
65. See Malvo, 893 F.3d at 276 (“In this case, by distinction, Malvo seeks to
challenge his sentences, not his guilty-plea convictions, on the ground that they
were retroactively made unconstitutional under the rule announced in Miller.”).
66. Id. at 275.
67. Id. at 276; Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016)
(“Substantive rules, then, set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that
place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State's power
to impose.”).
68. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 720 (2017). In Virginia,
a Miller violation can be addressed on direct review or in a habeas proceeding.
Because the violation, if proven, does not render the sentence void ab initio but
merely voidable, it cannot be addressed by a motion to vacate filed years after the
sentence became final. See also Costello, supra note 11, § 62.12, at 1087 (noting
that “a voidable judgment may be attacked only while the trial court that
rendered it still has jurisdiction”).
69. Malvo, 893 F.3d at 276
[T]here is a narrow class of claims that we have allowed a defendant to
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two interpretations, the Court should declare whether or not a
Miller violation is such a substantive right that a defendant may
attack the sentence both on direct appeal and collateral appeal.
They should also explain whether a juvenile defendant can
knowingly and voluntarily waive an unknown and nonexistent (at
the time) constitutional right.
VI. Conclusion
As long as there are defendants currently incarcerated who
were sentenced to life as a juvenile, courts are going to have to
continue to address their legal remedies, if any. However, while
the law might be settled in some areas, the issues in Jones and
Malvo have opened a rift between how some courts apply Supreme
Court precedent. It is important for the Court to clarify once more
how states and lower federal courts are to handle juveniles who
have been sentenced to die in prison.

raise on direct appeal despite a general waiver of appellate rights,
including a claim that the sentence imposed [was] in excess of the
maximum penalty provided by statute, and indicating that we see no
reason to distinguish between waivers of direct-appeal rights and
waivers of collateral-attack rights. (Citations and quotations omitted.)

